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Abstract 
 
The major purpose of the study is to examine how Bayesian networks can be used to 
represent and understand potential ignition scenarios in nuclear waste decommissioning. 
This is illustrated using a network to represent a situation with stacked storage boxes 
containing pyrophoric material removed from waste storage silos. Corrosion of this 
material during storage produces hydrogen which is released through a filter medium into 
the gap between the boxes. The probabilistic relationships used to indicate dependence 
between network nodes are expressed by conditional probability tables or C++ coded 
equations that relate to UK nuclear industry corrosion and storage data. The study focuses 
on optimal prediction of the likelihood of a flammable hydrogen atmosphere arising in 
the gap between stacked boxes and the conditions necessary to exceed the lower 
flammable limit. It is concluded that the approach offers a useful means of easily 
determining the manner in which varying the controlling parameters affects the 
possibility of an ignition event. The effect of data variation can be examined at first hand 
using the supplementary Bayesian Network that accompanies the article. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hydrogen explosion hazards have been a particular concern relating to waste storage 
decommissioning and reprocessing operations which involve Magnox containing waste 
[1]. Corrosion of magnesium containing material in the waste sludge, together with the 
effects of radiolysis, produces hydrogen gas which can be held in pockets enveloped in 
the sludge. If these pockets are disturbed during processing or storage operations there is 
the possibility of developing a flammable atmosphere in the ullage space above the 
sludge. A useful discussion and survey of reactive metal corrosion during nuclear waste 
packaging has been provided by Serco Technical Consulting Services in an extensive 
report for the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority [2]. Details of the corrosion and 
storage of Magnox-containing waste in the UK are also available from a report made 
available in the public domain by Nuclear Technologies plc [3]. 
 
There are a variety of possible ignition sources that can develop during decommissioning, 
including electrostatic (Ingram et al. [4]) and mechanical (Jones et al. [5], Averill et al. 
[6-10]). Of particular importance are those relating to surface heating or sparking caused 
by mechanical stimuli; e.g. sliding contact or impacts involving metal bodies or a metal 
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body with a concrete silo wall. The presence of pyrophoric magnesium-containing 
material poses a much enhanced risk of an ignition source occurring. Averill et al. [9] 
have discussed the complex uncertainties involved in determining the ignition 
probabilities with pyrophoric surface substances present and suggested a mechanism for 
the ignition of hydrogen in air atmospheres by pyrophoric (Mg/O2, Mg/N2 or Mg/iron 
oxides thermite) reaction. It is also possible, at higher impact energy, for ignition of 
hydrogen in air atmospheres to occur with clean metal on metal impacts [8].    
 
Underpinned by a continuing body of research, the Hydrogen Hazards Unit at LSBU, has 
collaborated with Sellafield Ltd to produce a comprehensive Technical Guide to 
hydrogen safety2. This provides comprehensive information concerning the general 
design principles and calculations relating to hydrogen issues that could arise during 
nuclear decommissioning in the UK. An important component of the Guide is a road map 
approach to aid process engineers in recognizing the likelihood of an ignition event 
occurring. Following this work, the major purpose of this paper is to examine how such 
road maps can be represented by corresponding Bayesian networks to better understand 
potential incident scenarios. Bayesian statistics also offers a means of including any prior 
knowledge that is available, particularly the relevant beliefs held by experts in the field. 
This is sharply different to classical statistical methods such as experimental design [6, 7] 
where prior information is discarded. Data that becomes available is used to continually 
update a Bayesian model or network which is initially specified by the prior knowledge.  
 
Bayesian networks effectively mesh together Bayesian theorem probability calculations 
and graphical theory. They facilitate an immediate visualization of all dependent and 
independent relationships within the model enabling a wider understanding of the 
process. An important aspect of these networks is that the conditional probabilities used 
to represent the uncertainty of the true state of a variable can be changed, with the 
variable being set to a known value when relevant hard evidence is discovered or the 
uncertainty updated following new but still uncertain evidence. These changes result in 
an update of the unknown nodes in the network which involves the application of 
sophisticated algorithms to carry out complex probability calculus. In this manner, the 
effect of changing conditions can be seen propagating throughout even highly 
complicated networks.  Backwards analysis through the network occurs as well as 
forward analysis, thus enabling the full effect of available hard evidence to be easily 
visualised.  
    
This paper focuses on optimal prediction of the likelihood of a flammable gas atmosphere 
arising in the gap between stacked waste storage boxes which contain pyrophoric 
material removed during nuclear decommissioning operations. The model is based on 
realistic data related to the corrosion and storage of Magnox-containing waste in the UK.  
Although it deals with a specific application, it is envisaged that a similar approach could 
easily be developed for other storage and possible ignition scenarios. A summary 
introduction to the relevant aspects of Bayesian inference and networks is given in the 
next section. 
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2. Bayesian conditional probability, likelihood and networks 
 
In our laboratory ignition experiments [5-10], the probability of ignition was simply 
determined by the number of times it actually occurred divided by the total number of 
similar tests carried out. This is clearly useful to deal with situations which replicate the 
experimental conditions but may be of limited use in the real world where there is 
uncertainty and the possibility of enormous environmental variation. If there are no 
previous reported instances or experimental test results of ignitions occurring under the 
same conditions being considered, an inclusive approach can be adopted based on 
Bayesian or conditional probability: this can formalise a consensus belief under 
conditions of uncertainty and utilise all of the information available.  
 
Although Bayes' theorem has in recent years been much discussed in the literature, there 
can be some difficulty in properly understanding the fundamentally important difference 
between likelihood and conditional probability. Bayes' theorem can be expressed as a 
relationship between the prior )(µP  and the likelihood µYP( ) (with a data term P(Y) 
included as a scaling or normalising parameter) to give an updated posterior µ(P |Y). 
 
  )(/)()()( YPPYPYP µµµ =            (1) 
 
Here, the prior represents a probability distribution (hypothesis) of the possible mean 
value for the data being considered which allows for the incorporation of both pre-
existing knowledge and expert belief. It is updated by the likelihood ratio P(Y|µ)/P(Y) 
which considers any future evidence and determines the probability of that data occurring 
for each possible value of µ within the distribution. Multiplying these probabilities by the 
prior distribution then allows the posterior to be obtained which represents the altered and 
updated probability distribution of the mean value. It should be recognised that likelihood 
values differ from conditional probability, in that they are not constrained to be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive with a total probability value of unity: this makes it necessary 
for likelihood ratios to be used in the updating process rather than individual likelihoods. 
The application of likelihood ratios can be illustrated using a simple example involving 
ignition laboratory tests results. Figure 1 shows the likelihoods (determined from a 
binomial distribution) for a series of 10, 20 and 30 tests in which there were 4 and 8 and 
12 positive ignition results. The plots are scaled so that the best supported ignition 
probability of 0.4 for each set of tests corresponds in each case to a likelihood of 1. 
Clearly the increase in number of tests has narrowed down the likely range of the ignition 
probability: the likelihood of the ignition probability being 0.6 as apposed to 0.4, for 
example, is seen from the Plots as greatly decreasing with increase in the number of tests 
involved. This observation is formalised by comparing the likelihoods with that for the 
most supported hypothesis for ignition probability. The likelihood ratios for 10, 20 and 
30 tests; 2.25, 5.1 and 11.4 directly indicate the extent to which the most supported 
ignition probability (0.4) is more likely than that under consideration (0.6). Finding 
additional evidence, in this case by increasing the number of tests, and taking account of 
the likelihoods enables a modified (posterior) distribution of the ignition probability 
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hypothesis to be obtained. When experimental evidence or data is not available, expert 
belief can be taken into account to formulate the prior distribution.  
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Figure 1. Likelihood function for a series of ignition tests. 
 
 
2.1. Belief judgements and expert opinion. 
 
The philosophical nature of subjective and objective judgement has been much discussed 
with considerable differences in the conclusions reached. There is indeed little apparent 
agreement as to what constitutes the difference between objective and subjective 
judgements or beliefs. For many purposes, expert beliefs can be considered in terms of 
being epistemically objective in that they relate to the distinction between truth and 
falsity or accuracy and inaccuracy. Judgments concerning such as degree of beauty, are 
clearly subjective in that accuracy or truth is not an absolute. There is no measurable 
scientific way of settling the matter. Although it is a more difficult matter to assess the 
degree of objectivity in an expert opinion regarding a hypothesis (such as for the most 
likely probability of an ignition occurring) these judgments will generally be regarded as 
subjective.  
 
When there is a lack of evidential data on which to base a prior distribution for a 
parameter, it can be formulated on the basis of subjective expert belief or opinion [11-
13]. As Kuhnert et.al. [11] point out, the uncertainty expressed by the experts may be 
epistemic because of lack of knowledge or be due to natural variation: in most cases it is 
likely to represent a combination of both. If the natural uncertainty outweighs the 
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epistemic uncertainty then further research effort to reduce the uncertainty may be futile. 
The aggregation of opinions from multiple experts can be performed in many different 
ways allowing the overall uncertainty to be determined and an estimate of a standard 
error to be made. If the elicitation of one expert alone is sought then the expert, apart 
from having a high degree of subject expertise, will be required to have sufficient 
knowledge of probability theory to enable the uncertainty to be properly expressed (i.e. in 
the form of a probability distribution).     
 
Berger [13] has considered in detail the subjective determination of the prior density and 
outlined various approaches. These include the histogram approach which involves 
plotting a histogram of the subjective probability of each interval of the unknown 
variable. This, however, can be difficult to work with and there are difficulties on account 
of tails being missing from the prior density. Another approach, that of matching a given 
functional form entails assuming a given functional form and then choosing the density 
of this distribution which best matches prior beliefs. This usually involves calculation 
from estimated prior moments (µ, σ or in the case of beta distributions, α, β) but as 
Berger points out, this can be an uncertain undertaking due to the fact that the tails of a 
probability density can have a serious effect on the magnitude of its moments. A better 
method of establishing prior parameters according to Berger, is to take estimates of 
several fractiles (quantiles) of the prior distribution and then select parameters which lead  
to a density that matches these quantiles as closely as possible. Because tables of 
quantiles of standard densities are readily available, it is easier to estimate these 
subjectively rather than try to estimate the distribution moments. This approach is 
particularly useful where only very vague prior information is available and it has the 
advantage of simpler application. Where possible, it is useful to compare the functional 
form selected with a comparison of the ratios of intuitive likelihoods at various locations 
within the distribution. It can easily be seen from the example given earlier concerning 
the likelihood of ignition test results (Fig.1), that knowledge (or belief) of the likelihood 
ratios will enable a probability distribution to be quantitatively characterised. This also 
remains the case for unsymmetrical distributions.  
 
 
2.2. Networks 
 
Bayesian networks are probabilistic graphical models, Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) in 
which system variables (nodes) are connected by directional arrows (arcs). They are 
directional indicating dependence with an arc from node A to node B implying some 
causality (i.e. A causes B). The distinction between causal relationship between nodes 
and that corresponding to mere correlation is an important one and not always easy to 
determine. It has been pointed out that if the relationship between at least three variables 
is measured, intuition suggests that one of the variables will virtually control the 
relationship between the others [14]. Networks can initially be set up in a simple fashion  
and a more complex system built up by the introduction and combination of more nodes 
with their own relatively simple relationships.  
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Because Bayesian networks are acyclic there are no loops between nodes or any feedback 
cycle possible. Although nodes can be discrete or continuous they must be consistent in 
that a continuous defined node cannot be parent to a discrete definition child. Continuous 
defined nodes are, however, often avoided through a simple process of considering the 
continuous distribution as a sequence of quantiles with finite intervals over the 
continuous range: this, as explained above, is a useful way of encapsulating expert belief. 
The probabilistic relationships, indicating dependence between the nodes, is encoded 
either by conditional probability tables (CPT) or through the use of equations which 
specify the tables. This encoding describes how each combination of parental node states, 
in turn, influences each child state. The root nodes are by nature specified only by prior 
probability distributions since they are not influenced by any other network nodes. 
Conditional probabilities assigned to each child node state must take into account the 
influence of every possible combination of parent node states. The can be determined in a 
variety of ways, utilising the results of experimental tests or case histories, theoretical 
analysis or eliciting expert opinion. In some networks it is possible to define the CPT by 
a process of learning from a collection of cases where these are available.  
 
Once set up, a Bayesian network represents the uncertainty of a variables (e.g. presence 
of a flammable atmosphere) true state in terms of a number of conditional probabilities. If 
the condition of the true state becomes known through hard evidence (such as readings 
from gas sensors) in Bayesian network terms the node is described as instantiated. 
Instantiation results in immediate updating of the assigned beliefs contained in the 
uncertain nodes in the network. Where the new evidence (of for example the gas sensor 
readings) is itself uncertain in nature, it can be incorporated as a "likelihood finding: this, 
like instantiation, results in an update of the unknown nodes in the network. The effect of 
new evidence propagating throughout the network represents a major advantage in using 
them to more fully understand the phenomena being modelled. To properly understand 
how this relates to conditional dependence and independence (d-separation) in the 
network it is necessary to recognise that parent nodes become marginally independent 
when the child node is hidden (i.e. unknown) and become dependent when it is known. In 
the case of a root node, the child nodes are dependent when the root node is hidden and 
conditionally independent when it is known.  
 
A further important aspect of using Bayesian networks is in decision making (e.g. in the 
design process of a decommissioning operation) where utility functions are incorporated 
which express the extent to which desired outcomes are achieved. The information they 
contain becomes more readily visible to the design engineer rather than being buried 
amongst detailed data. 
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3. Implementation of the Bayesian network 
 
There is a wide range of network software available including generalised mathematical 
tools with network toolboxes (e.g. MatLab3 and Mathematica4) and more specialised 
software such as Netica5 and Hugin6 for the creation and analysis of Bayesian networks. 
The ease of use and highly intuitive graphical user interfaces of these specialised 
packages make them extremely attractive to the practising process safety engineer or 
analyst. An illustrative network will be presented here based upon a hypothetical waste 
storage operation scenario, using Netica software. The network represents the 
acceptability of storage conditions (in relation to the development of a flammable 
atmosphere) following the removal of pyrophoric material containing waste sludge from 
a nuclear waste silo.  
 
In the scenario being considered, 1 metre cubed stacked boxes are being used for the long 
term storage of nuclear waste material which contains Magnox. This is continuing to 
corrode within the boxes generating hydrogen gas as bi-product. The gas rises through a 
covering water layer into the 100 mm depth ullage space and is released through a filter: 
the buoyant gas then flows through horizontal gaps between the stacked boxes creating 
the possibility of an ignition hazard. As well as controlling the possibility of hydrogen 
gas concentration increasing sufficiently to form a flammable mixture either in the box 
itself or in the gap between boxes, there are other major concerns outside the scope of 
this article:  maintenance of the water content of the boxes and prevention of radionuclide 
escape. 
 
A schematic view of the arrangement considered is shown in Figure 2 where an upper 
box is seen positioned above a lower chamber to create a gap. Using a simple 
experimental arrangement with a sub-micron stainless steel mesh filter medium and 
containing the stacked boxes within a larger enclosure to minimise convection effects, 
initial experiments to measure gas concentration distribution between the chambers 
indicated a number of influences controlling the gas dispersion. The indicated effects of 
gas generation flow rate, gap height between stacked boxes and the size and position of 
the filter were first encapsulated into the generalised Bayesian network shown in Figure 
3.  
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Figure 2. Schema of the waste storage stacking 
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Figure 3. A Bayesian network for storage of nuclear waste in stacked waste boxes. 
 
This involved the combination of expert opinion summarising the known data and 
underlying science. On scientific grounds, it is very clear as to what parameters control 
the Magnox corrosion rate: i.e. pH, temperature and amount of exposed material. The 
other relationships took into account unreported (at this stage) experimental results at 
LSBU and elsewhere as well as scientific principles. A network like this can be tested for 
validity and consistency by the later introduction of evidence or if available case study. 
 
As can be seen, there are seven root notes (A – G) for which prior information must be 
specified. Nodes A, B and C the Magnox (Al 80) content of the waste, pH and 
temperature determine the hydrogen generation rate in the lower child box (H). This, 
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together with the filter effectiveness and gap height, governs the maximum concentration 
of hydrogen in the ullage (M) and gap space (L). The state of the Acceptable conditions 
node (N) depends upon the levels of radionuclide escape (J) and water loss rate (K) as 
well as the hydrogen concentration in the gap being less than the lower flammable limit.  
 
The cathodic reaction which occurs during the Magnox corrosion process produces both 
hydrogen gas and hydroxyl ions according to:  
 
   2H2O + 2e- H2 + OH-     (2) 
 
concomitant with the anodic dissolution reaction: 
 
   Mg  Mg2+ +2e-       (3) 
 
In neutral unbuffered solutions, such as would initially be the case with Magnox waste 
dumped into silos and covered with water, the pH in the vicinity of the metal surfaces 
will be shifted in the alkaline direction as corrosion progresses until it reaches 10.4 
corresponding to a saturated Mg(OH)2 solution. A partially protective hydroxide surface 
film (small random orientated crystals of brucite [2]) forms at pH values exceeding 11 
which could result from dosing with NaOH:  
 
   Mg2+ + 2OH-  Mg (OH)2      (4) 
 
This will reduce the corrosion and hydrogen generation rate, behaviour that can be 
incorporated into the network by introducing probabilistic equations with conditional IF 
THEN ELSE relationships dependent on the expected pH value (including the effect of 
dosing with NaOH).  
 
An important issue is that small amounts of anions or heavy metal cations can have a 
major effect on the corrosion rate making it difficult in the absence of direct data to 
predict the hydrogen generation rate during storage. The amount of uncorroded Magnox 
contained in the waste is also not likely to be known with any certainty but can be 
assessed on the basis of known information relating to the contents and conditions of the 
particular decommissioned waste storage silo and the storage time as well as any 
observations made. It is the surface area of the metal per unit volume of waste that 
determines the amount of Magnox available for reaction to generate hydrogen. In 
consequence, it is a major factor in determining the hydrogen generation rate from a 
given volume of waste. Magnox corrosion in nuclear waste appears to change when the 
temperature reaches and exceeds a temperature of somewhere between 55 to 65ºC. At 
lower temperatures there seems to be relatively little dependence on temperature whereas 
at higher temperatures there is a strong dependence. Much more difficult to take into 
account is "Breakaway" which could occur when waste is being disturbed during its 
transfer from silos into boxes. Breakaway is a term used to denote an increase in 
corrosion rate brought about by fracture of the protective layer where there is an inability 
for the surface to reform a protective film. If breakaway occurs to any significant extent 
due to mechanical damage (may also arise if the temperature increases to 80ºC), the 
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stable long term corrosion and hydrogen generation rates can accelerate and for a time be 
greatly exceeded.   
 
The Simplified Model of Gas Generation (SMOGG [15]), a tool developed for modelling 
gas generation from radioactive wastes in the UK National Inventory can be used to 
determine the hydrogen gas generation rates for specific storage and composition 
conditions. However, for the purposes of this article the effects of breakaway and 
temperature on the hydrogen generation rate are generically represented and modelled 
using appropriate equations between the corresponding parents and child. The waste pH 
is taken as the long term value between11and 13 which results from dosing with NaOH 
in the silos. It follows that long term corrosion rates are appropriate except when 
breakaway occurs.   
 
A simple model is used here to represent distribution of the amount of uncorroded 
Magnox in the waste boxes although in practice it might be necessary to replace it with a 
better fitting multi modal probability distribution.  The prior parameters for the model can 
be obtained, as outlined earlier, by a process of making estimates of several quantiles and 
then selecting parameters which produces a probability distribution that matches the 
quantiles as closely as possible. Three beta distributions are shown in Figure 4 
representing different possible beliefs and uncertainty relating to the amount of 
uncorroded Magnox swarf contained in a box of waste. The situation modelled in this 
paper is for waste collection from a succession of silos that result in a distribution skewed 
in the manor shown with α = 2 and β = 5 Here it can be seen that there are more boxes 
with smaller amounts of Magnox swarf than with large amounts: the mean is greater than 
the median and mode values due to the uneven distribution of the amounts (and 
condition) of waste metal in the storage silos being emptied. The two parameters α and β 
which characterise the distributions are related to the mean or expected value (µ), 
variance (σ2) and mode (m).  
             βα
αµ
+
=        (5) 
  ( ) ( )12
2
+++
= βαβα
βα
σ       (6) 
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1
−+
−
= βα
α
m   `    (7) 
 
When parameters α and β are equal, the distribution becomes symmetrical, resembling 
the bell shaped normal distribution: with skewed distributions as required here, the values 
of α and β will always differ. Whatever the value of the parameters, the continuous beta 
function always takes a value between 0 and 1 which is used to model the belief 
probability. It is often the case that is easier and more convenient to specify the mean and 
variance first and then translate them into the corresponding beta distribution parameters.    
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 Figure 4. Beta probability distributions representing belief in the distribution of 
uncorroded Magnox in the storage boxes. The variable x is an arbitrarily scaled  
magnitude of the amount of Magnox. 
 
    Conditional probability relationships between children and parent nodes can be directly 
formulated as a Table or be expressed by deterministic or probabilistic equations. 
Whatever the form of the equation, the only nodes which can be referenced in the 
equation are (i) the node which the equation defines, (ii) the parents of this node and (iii) 
any constant node which is involved. In all cases, the equations must be converted to 
Tables (CPT) before the network is compiled. Sometimes it is helpful and convenient to 
define intermediate variables, implementing them as new nodes in order to simplify the 
equations. Examples of the different ways of expressing node conditionality are included 
in the NETICA network file for hydrogen concentration development in the gap space7 
which is supplementary to this article. Although illustrative in nature, the C++ coded 
equations (available for inspection in the network) reflect real corrosion data [2] and are 
representational of those which are appropriate for use in the process of the kind 
described here. It should be noted that in some cases when using the network, due to the 
variability of the size of the interval bands chosen for the data, the shape of the 
probability distribution shown will appear as a visual distortion of the real probability 
density. 
 
The network for the hydrogen concentration in the gap space, shown in Figure 5, consists 
of 5 parent and 5 child nodes. All of these, except "Gap" (which is a discrete variable), 
represent continuous variables and show software generated % probability values for the 
states based on the assigned distributions: the figures shown at the bottom of the boxes 
are the mean and a measure of uncertainty. Figure 5 shows network values before the 
initial values of the five parent nodes; “Breakaway-mechanical damage to swarf”, “Waste 
temperature (Celsius),” “Area-weight ratio of swarf”, “Wt (kg) uncorroded Magnox in 
box” and “Gap” are updated from later evidence.  If, as an example, updating of 
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evidential data indicates that these parent nodes are instantiated to Small, 45ºC, 3, 11 kg 
and 30 mm respectively, then the network is changed to that shown in Figure 6 indicating 
a relatively small chance of a possible flammable atmosphere (> 4% H) forming within 
the gap. The maximum hydrogen concentration in the gap space indicates that the 
probability of forming an atmosphere which just exceeds the lower flammability limit is 
approximately 0.2. If, as a further example, sensor evidence is gathered on the % 
hydrogen concentration in the ullage space but it is of an unsure nature, it can be 
introduced as a likelihood finding. This consists of entering a probability for each state of 
the node which is the probability that the evidential observation would be made if the 
node were in that state. Entering a probability of 1 indicates that the evidence supports 
the existing state probability whereas a value of 0 indicates that the state is now 
considered impossible: intermediate values, of course, represent a supported degree of 
change. For a gap height of 15 mm, entering the likelihood finding; 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 …, into 
the node for %concentration of H in the ullage space changes the network to that shown 
in Figure 7. The effect on the probability states for the hydrogen concentration within the 
ullage can be seen as well as the way that the network has changed other node values to 
be consistent with the new evidence.    
   
The network described has been shown to offer the means of readily understanding and 
predicting the effect of future observations on the probability that a flammable 
atmosphere would arise between the stacked boxes: this with little doubt, is achieved in a 
much easier manner than could be expected by adopting other approaches.   
 
 
4.0 Conclusions. 
A Bayesian network has been described to represent and understand a potential hazard 
scenario in nuclear waste decommissioning. This relates to an illustrative example of 
stacked storage boxes (containing pyrophoric material which has been removed from 
waste storage silos) in which hydrogen is generated through corrosion. The hydrogen 
generation rate is determined by the amount and condition of the waste material in the 
boxes and the temperature since the pH is fixed by previous dosing procedures. 
Employing realistic values for these parent nodes and taking into account the gap height 
between the boxes, it is indicated that the lower flammability limit of hydrogen in air 
(4%) is not expected to be exceeded under the most likely storage conditions.  
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Breakaway-mechanical damage to swarf
None
Small
Significant
85.0
12.0
3.00
10.7 ± 1.8
Magnox corrosion rate 
0 to 4e-6
4e-6 to 7e-6
7e-6 to 1e-5
1e-5 to 3e-5
3e-5 to 5e-5
5e-5 to 7.72e-4
13.6
84.1
1.27
0.99
.008
.002
5.22e-6 ± 2.9e-6
H gen rate (Litres per hr) in the box
0 to 0.2
0.2 to 0.4
0.4 to 0.6
0.6 to 0.8
0.8 to 1
1 to 1.2
1.2 to 1.4
1.4 to 1.6
1.6 to 1.8
1.8 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 197
60.8
25.2
9.41
2.86
1.04
0.37
0.13
.055
.034
.024
.054
.014
.004
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
0.223 ± 0.41
Waste temperature (Celsius)
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 60
60 to 70
70 to 80
35.1
55.1
9.69
0.13
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
22.5 ± 6.9
Area-weight ratio of Swarf
1
2
3
4
10.0
20.0
50.0
20.0
2.8 ± 0.87
Wt (kg) uncorroded Magnox in box
0 to 2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
10 to 12
12 to 14
14 to 16
16.6
29.9
25.9
16.5
7.92
2.63
0.44
.015
4.58 ± 2.7
%concentration of H in ullage space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
71.7
14.9
6.10
3.95
2.17
0.79
0.29
.056
.019
.007
.004
.003
.002
.003
.002
.002
.001
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
.006
1.05 ± 1.2
Mean % concentration of H in gap space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
81.0
12.3
4.48
1.73
0.41
.056
.016
.006
.004
.003
.002
.002
.002
.001
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
.006
0.79 ± 0.9
Max %concentration of H in gap space 
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
73.3
14.4
5.92
3.76
1.77
0.60
0.18
.037
.011
.005
.003
.002
.003
.002
.002
.001
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
 0 +
.005
0.996 ± 1.2
Gap 
Height 15mm
Height 30mm
Height 50mm
35.0
35.0
30.0
 
 
Figure 5.  Illustrative Bayesian network with initial values.  
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Breakaway-mechanical damage to swarf
None
Small
Significant
   0
 100
   0
14
Magnox corrosion rate 
0 to 4e-6
4e-6 to 7e-6
7e-6 to 1e-5
1e-5 to 3e-5
3e-5 to 5e-5
5e-5 to 7.72e-4
   0
   0
   0
64.5
35.5
   0
2.71e-5 ± 1.1e-5
H gen rate (Litres per hr) in the box
0 to 0.2
0.2 to 0.4
0.4 to 0.6
0.6 to 0.8
0.8 to 1
1 to 1.2
1.2 to 1.4
1.4 to 1.6
1.6 to 1.8
1.8 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 197
   0
   0
   0
   0
1.10
5.42
7.61
7.35
5.48
6.00
31.3
18.1
16.1
1.49
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
2.71 ± 1.2
Waste temperature (Celsius)
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 60
60 to 70
70 to 80
   0
   0
   0
 100
   0
   0
   0
45 ± 2.9
Area-weight ratio of Swarf
1
2
3
4
   0
   0
 100
   0
3
Wt (kg) uncorroded Magnox in box
0 to 2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
10 to 12
12 to 14
14 to 16
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
 100
   0
   0
11 ± 0.58
%concentration of H in ullage space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
   0
4.88
24.9
27.3
21.4
20.2
1.26
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
3.81 ± 1.3
Mean % concentration of H in gap space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
3.22
33.3
36.9
25.6
0.97
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
2.38 ± 0.91
Max %concentration of H in gap space 
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
0.90
14.4
34.5
29.6
19.9
0.72
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
3.05 ± 1.1
Gap 
Height 15mm
Height 30mm
Height 50mm
   0
 100
   0
 
Figure 6.  The Bayesian network with instantiated parent values. 
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Magnox corrosion rate 
0 to 4e-6
4e-6 to 7e-6
7e-6 to 1e-5
1e-5 to 3e-5
3e-5 to 5e-5
5e-5 to 7.72e-4
   0
 100
   0
   0
   0
   0
5.5e-6 ± 8.7e-7
H gen rate (Litres per hr) in the box
0 to 0.2
0.2 to 0.4
0.4 to 0.6
0.6 to 0.8
0.8 to 1
1 to 1.2
1.2 to 1.4
1.4 to 1.6
1.6 to 1.8
1.8 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 197
   0
63.5
25.4
7.48
2.57
0.79
0.18
.022
 0 +
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
0.405 ± 0.18
Waste temperature (Celsius)
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 60
60 to 70
70 to 80
25.5
64.5
9.79
0.13
 0 +
 0 +
   0
23.5 ± 6.5
Area-weight ratio of Swarf
1
2
3
4
   0
3.37
59.8
36.8
3.33 ± 0.54
Wt (kg) uncorroded Magnox in box
0 to 2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
10 to 12
12 to 14
14 to 16
0.12
14.8
36.4
27.5
14.8
5.40
0.94
.032
6.24 ± 2.3
%concentration of H in ullage space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
   0
   0
45.4
30.1
16.6
5.81
1.89
0.18
.004
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
3.39 ± 1.1
Mean % concentration of H in gap space
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
   0
49.9
34.2
13.1
2.76
0.16
.003
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
2.19 ± 0.86
Max %concentration of H in gap space 
0 to 1
1 to 2
2 to 3
3 to 4
4 to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 10
10 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 13
13 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 16
16 to 17
17 to 18
18 to 19
19 to 20
20 to 100
   0
7.90
44.5
28.7
13.5
4.31
1.06
.078
.001
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
   0
3.15 ± 1.1
Gap 
Height 15mm
Height 30mm
Height 50mm
 100
   0
   0
Breakaway-mechanical damage to swarf
None
Small
Significant
86.7
11.3
2.06
10.6 ± 1.7
 
 
Figure 7.  The Bayesian network for a gap height of 15 mm and likelihood findings 
entered into the node: % concentration of H in ullage space.  
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